Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Sam H. Bennion v. ANR Production Company, a
Delaware corproation and the Utah State Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining, an agency of the State of Utah
: Amicus Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Peter Stirba, Barbara Zimmerman; McKay, Burton & Thurman; attorneys for appellant.
Thomas Mitchell; assistant attorney general; John P. Harrington, Alan A. Enke; Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker; attorneys for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Bennion v. ANR Production, No. 900473.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3226

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH ^Uppc^E COURT

NO. —

—

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SAM H, BENNION,
Appellant,
Case No. 900473

vs.
ANR PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation and the
UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL, GAS
and MINING, an agency of the
State of Utah,

Priority 15

Appellees.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
Peter Stirba
Barbara Zimmerman
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorneys for Appellant
Thomas Mitchell
Assistant Attorney General
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL' S OFFICE
Three Triad Center, #250
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Attorneys for Utah State
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
Appellee
John P. Harrington
Alan A. Enke
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for ANR
P r o d u c t i o n , Appellee

Phillip Wm. Lear
John W. Andrews
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, #1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas
Association and Utah
Petroleum Association

FILFD
jy|/$ 5

|99t

Clerk, Supreme Court Utah

II I 'Mil ; l!T/ Ill SUPREME C O U R T
SAM } L BENNION,
Appellant!
Case *T-

vs.
ANR

pR0D(JCTI0N

C0MpANY/

900473

a

Delaware corporation and the
UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL, GAS
and MINING, an agency of the
State of Utah,,

Priority 15

Appellees,

BRIEF O
\ i} PEAL F R O M A N O R D E R O F T H E U T A H STATE
B O A R D O F Oil ,, GAS A N D MINING
?r"er Stirca
3arbara Zir.mer man
McKAY. BURTON .4 7HURMAN
1200 Kennecot: Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City -,"T - - " : j
^"::rnevs f r. r Acpelldr. t
Thomas Mitchell
Assistant Attorney General
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL' S OFF:
Three Triad Center, #2 50
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Attorneys for Utah State
Beard of Oil, Gas and Mining,
Accellee
Jo:r.

:arrington

Alan A. En- •

RAY, QUINN;., & NEBEKER
"9 South Ma,n Street
Salt Lake City, UT B4;:1
Attorneys for ANR
Production, Appellee

Phillip

W'IIL

Lear

J o h n W, Andrews

VAN COTT, BAGLF"
MCCARTHY
50 South Ma.un oiieei *
Salt Lake City, UT ^ :
Attorneys : or Amid
Rocky Mountain Oil a~c
Association and Utah
Petroleum Association

•;

)

^ftf;

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

Nature of the Case

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

C.

Statement of Facts

.
....

3
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENT
I.

11
THE NON-CONSENT PENALTY, AND ITS APPLICATION TO
BENNION ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD BY
THIS COURT
A.
B.

11

The Supreme Court Must Give Great Deference to
Legislative Exercise of the Police Power.
...

11

The Risk-Penaltv System Is Rationally Related to
Reasonable Legislative Goals

13

II. THE IMPOSITION OF THE RISK-PENALTY UPONBENNION IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
A.

B.

III.

3

Substantial Evidence Supports The Board' s
Decision

18

The Oklahoma Cases Cited bv Bennion Support
RMOGA' s Position

23

THE BOARD ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN ITS
AUTHORITY IN MODIFYING THE 1981 POOLING ORDER
A.

18

...

The Board Had Authority to Modify Its Previous
Order Pooling Interests In the Drilling Unit.

.

28

28

B.

C.

No Vested Rights Were Impaired Bv the Board' s
Action

31

The Board Need Not Make Any Finding of Economic
Feasibility Prior to Allowing Second Wells.
. .

33

IV. THE BOARD'S ORDER IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST
CONCLUSION

36

-11g: \wpc\160\00000rrs.W51

35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Alber v. Nolle, 645 P. 2d 456 (N. M. App. 1982)
Amoco Production Company v. Corporation Comm' n of
Oklahoma, 751 P. 2d 203, 207 (Okla. App. 1986) . . .

27
23, 24, 32

Amoco Production Company v. Corporation Comm' n of
Oklahoma, 752 P. 2d 835 (Okla. App. 1987)

23

Anderson v. Corporation Commission, 327 P. 2d 699
(Okla. 1957)

26, 27, 36

Bastian v. King, 661 P. 2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983)

13

Cougar Business Owr.ar' s Ass' n v. State, 647 P. 2d
481, 487-88 (Wash. 1982)
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
125, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (1978)
Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm' n. ,
532 P. 2d 419 (Okla. 1975)

27
14
26, 32

Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222, 64 S. Ct.
19, 22 (1943)

12

In Re Kohlman, 263 N. W. 2d 674 (S. D. 1978)
Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm' n, 767
P. 2d 404 (Okla. 1988)
Miller v. Corporation Comm' n. , 635 P. 2d 1006,

21
26, 32

1007 (Okla. 1981)

12

Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F. 2d 564,575 (10th Cir. 1984) . . . .
Railroad Commission v. Aluminum Corp. of America,
380 S. W. 2d 599, 602 (Tex. 1964)
Ricker v. Board of Ed. of Millard County,
396 P. 2d 416 (Utah 1964)
Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. , 244 P. 2d
852, 858 (Okla. 1951)

-iii-

14
29
29

30, 32

Vierson v. Bennett, 353 P. 2d 114, 118-119
(Okla. 1960)

30

Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation
Comm' n, 672 P. 2d 280 (N. M. 1983)

22

Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. , 501 P. 2d
503 (Okla. 1972)

26, 32, 36

Wells v. Children' s Aid Society of Utah, 681
P. 2d 199, 205 (Utah 1984)

14

Wimberly v. New Mexico State Police Bd. , 497 P. 2d
968 (N. M. 1972)

29

Windsor Gas Corp. v. Railroad Comm' n of Texas,
529 S. W. 2d 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975)

21

STATUTES
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116 (7) (b)
La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30: 10A(2)

Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-7(2) (g)

. .

16
16
17

Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-202 (2) (b)

17

N. M. Stat Ann. § 70-2-17(c)

17

Tex Nat. Res. Code. Ann. § 102.052

17

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1

2, 11, 35

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6

2, 5, 11, 12

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)

1, 3, 4, 8, 12-14, 17, 18

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (a)

18

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (b)

19

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(3) (a)

29

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5)

29
-iv-

g:\wpc\160\00000rrs.W51

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (c) (iv) (Supp. 1990)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 through -18 (1988)

1
2, 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES
1 B. Kramer & P. Martin, The Law of Pooling and
Unitization §12.03 (3d Ed. 1990)
H. Williams & C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and
Gas Terms 613, 849 (7th Ed. 1987)
Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization:
State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners,
7 Journal of Energy L. & Pol'y 255 (1986)

17
8

15, 24

Validity of Compulsory Pooling or Unitization
Statutes, 37 A. L. R. 2d 434 (1954)

-v-

12

JURISDICTION QF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme C o u r t has e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of
appeal

from an o r d e r of t h e Utah Board of O i l ,

p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(c)(iv)

an

Gas and Mining
(Supp.

1990).

STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES

By order

dated December 18, 1990, the Utah Supreme

Court granted leave to Amici Curiae, the Rocky Mountain Oil and
Gas Association and the Utah Petroleum Association

(collectively

referred to herein as "amici"). to f i l e t h i s brief Amici Curiae.
Amici respond only to those issues raised by appellant
Sam H. Bennion ("Bennion") having s i g n i f i c a n t policy implications
such t h a t they should be considered by the Supreme Court.

Those

issues are:
1.

Are the non-consent penalty 1 provisions contained in

the Utah forced pooling s t a t u t e fUtah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)]
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , both on t h e i r face and as applied to Bennion?
Amici believe t h a t the non-consent penalty represents a r a t i o n a l
and economically sound l e g i s l a t i v e approach to encouraging
prudent energy development in the State of Utah.

The application

Respondent ANR Production Company has defined many of the t e c h n i c a l terms
r e f e r r e d to in t h i s proceeding in Section I I I of i t s b r i e f . Amici b e l i e v e t h a t
t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s are h e l p f u l and a c c u r a t e , and hereby adopt the d e f i n i t i o n s by
reference.
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of the statute to Bennion is reasonable under the factual
circumstances presented here and is clearly constitutional.

It

should not be disturbed by this Court.
2.

Did the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the

"Board") have authority to amend its 1981 order pooling interests
in the drilling unit to impose a non-consent penalty upon Bennion
for the costs of a second well in the unit?

If so, should the

Board' s decision doing so in this case be upheld?

Amici believe

that the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 406-1 through -18 (1988) (the "Conservation Act"), generally, and
the Utah forced pooling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6,
specifically, grant the Board this authority.

Further, Amici

believe that the Board7 s exercise of that authority here is
supported by substantial evidence.

Decisions such as this one

are within the scope of the Board' s expertise in oil and gas
matters, and therefore must be given substantial deference upon
review by the Supreme Court.
3.

Does the Board's order violate the "Declaration of

Public Interest" contained in the Conservation Act?

Amici

believe that, contrary to Bennion' s assertions, the attainment of
the public interests set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 would
be hindered significantly if Bennion' s positions were adopted.
Amici therefore urge the Supreme Court to affirm the Board' s
order and dismiss this appeal.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves judicial construction of the non-

consent (risk-penalty) provisions of the Utah forced pooling
statute.

The forced pooling statute is part of the Conservation

Act.
Bennion appeals from the Board' s order dated
September 20, 1990, imposing a non-consent penalty against
Bennion of 175% of his proportionate share of drilling and
completion costs for the Miles #2-lB5 Well in Duchesne County,
Utah.

The Board imposed the non-consent penalty because Bennion

refused to participate in the drilling of the well by respondent
ANR Production Company ("ANR").

Bennion challenges the

constitutionality of the non-consent penalty set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) and also contests the statutory authority
of the Board to impose the non-consent penalty in this situation.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Amici adopt by reference respondent ANR' s statement of

the course of proceedings and disposition below.
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C.

Statement of Facts
1.

On June 24, 1971, the Board entered Its order in

Cause No. 139-3 establishing a drilling (spacing) unit comprising
Section 1 of Township 2 South, Range 5 West, U. S. M.

The order

was subsequently amended on September 20, 1972, in Cause No. 1398.

Those orders authorized only one well to be drilled in the

unit for production from the designated horizon, in concert with
the existing statute.
2.

R. 3.

Bennion owns an undivided 2. 94898% mineral interest

in portions of Section 1.
3.

R. Exhibit 6, H4 at 7.

On June 12, 1973, all owners of oil and gas leases

and all owners of mineral interests in Section 1, except only
Bennion, entered into a voluntary pooling agreement to authorize
the drilling of an oil and gas well in the drilling unit.
4.

R. 3.

On July 7, 1974, Shell Oil Company completed the Tew

#1-1B5 Well (the "Tew Well") in the drilling unit as a well
capable of producing oil in commercial quantities.
5.
Ann.

R. 3.

In 1977 Utah's forced pooling statute, Utah Code

§ 40-6-6(6), was amended to require a penalty for non-

consenting owners.
6.

On April 4, 1981, the Board entered its order (the

"1981 Order") in Cause No. 139-63 statutorily pooling the
drilling unit effective as of July 26, 1979.

Statutory pooling

is frequently referred to in the industry as forced pooling.
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The

parties stipulated in the pooling order that Bennion would not be
required to pay the statutory non-consent penalty.

R. Exhibit 6.

The 1981 Order is attached as Addendum #1 to this brief and
incorporated herein by reference.
7.

Effective July 1, 1983, the Utah Legislature

repealed the existing Oil and Gas Conservation Act and enacted a
new statute.

The new statute added several features not

contained in the repealed version.

Of particular import is new

language that authorized the drilling of additional wells in
established drilling units.

See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (Supp.

1990).
8.

On August 1, 1986, ANR succeeded to the interest of

Shell Oil Company in the drilling unit and took over operation of
the well on December 1, 1986.

ANR accounted to Bennion for all

expenses incurred in the operation of the well, provided monthly
invoices, and deducted his pro rata share of expenses from the
monthly remittances of proceeds of production.
9.

R. 5.

On April 12, 1985, the Board entered its order (the

"1985 Order") in Cause No. 139-42 authorizing the drilling and
simultaneous production of two wells from each drilling unit in
the Greater Altamont-Bluebell-Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Area
Field").

R. Exhibit 6.

Section 1 and the well in question here

are located in Duchesne County in the Field.
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("the

The 1985 Order is

attached as Addendum #2 to this brief and incorporated herein by
reference.
10. On February 6, 1990, ANR commenced drilling
operations on the Miles #2-lB5 Well (the "Miles Well") in Section
1.

R. 6.
11. On March 20, 1990, ANR sent a letter to Bennion

inviting him to participate in the Miles Well and to pay his pro
rata share of expenses.

R. Exhibit 6D.

In contrast to Bennion' s

assertions in his brief, this offer required Bennion to pay his
pro rata share of costs only, not 300% of those costs.
Bennion Brief at 8.

I&. ; Q£.

The letter also included a geologic

prognosis for the Miles Well, and a drilling prognosis was
forwarded by ANR to Bennion under separate cover.
6C, 6D.

R. Exhibits 3,

Bennion chose not to participate in the drilling of the

Miles Well.

R. Exhibit 6D.

12. On April 10, 1990, ANR filed its Request for Agency
Action in Cause No. 139-63, seeking an order of the Board either
amending the original forced-pooling order to establish a nonconsent penalty for Bennion' s interest in the Miles Well or
entering a new order to the same effect.
13. On May 24, 1990, arguments of the parties were
heard, and ANR introduced evidence regarding the costs of
drilling to date and the estimated costs of drilling to
completion.
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14.

At the May 24, 1990 hearing, a petroleum landman

employed by ANR, Mr. David Laramie, testified that:
a. Bennion had been offered an opportunity
to sign the operating agreement for the unit,
but had refused (Transcript p. 14);
b.
Each company that was a party to the
unit operating agreement for Section 1 had an
option to participate in the drilling of the
Miles well or alternatively incur the
contractual 300 percent non-consent penalty
(Transcript p. 19);
c. Companies having working interests
comprising over 30% of the working interest in
the unit elected not to participate in the Miles
Well, and therefore voluntarily incurred the
300% contractual non-consent penalty
(Transcript, p. 22);
d. The drilling of the Miles Well to 14,000
feet involved inherent risks, including the
possibility of mechanical problems and of
uneconomic levels of production (Transcript p.
29-30).
15.

After briefing by the parties, the Board entered its

September 20, 1990 Order (the "1990 Order") that is the subject
of this appeal.

The 1990 Order amended the Board's 1981 Order to

impose a non-consent penalty on Bennion of 175% of his
proportionate share of drilling and completion costs for the
Miles Well.

A copy of the Order is attached as Addendum #3 to

this brief and incorporated herein by reference.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The non-consent penalty2 provisions of Utah' s forced
pooling statute, set forth in Utah Code Ann, § 40-6-6(6), are
constitutional because they are rationally related to the Utah
Legislature' s legitimate goal of encouraging the prudent
development of Utah7 s oil and gas resources.

In the absence of a

risk-penalty system, the owners of oil and gas interests have an
economic disincentive against participating financially in the
drilling of wells.

If no risk-penalty were assessed, such owners

could obtain all the benefits of the well if it were successful,
while paying none of the costs if it were not.

Conversely, those

drilling wells would share all of the benefits of their risktaking with "free-riders" such as Bennion, while bearing all of
the costs of an unsuccessful well.

The risk-penalty statute is a

sensible legislative exercise of the police power, similar to
both industry practice and the law of many other states, and
should be given great deference by the Supreme Court.
The statute is also constitutional as applied to
Bennion.

His claim that the Miles Well involved no risks,

z

The terms non-consent penalty and risk-penalty are synonymous. H. Williams
& C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 613, 849 (7th Ed. 1987). Williams and
Meyers define a nonconsent penalty as "A penalty against a party to a . . .
pooling or unitization agreement who did not agree in advance to participate in
the costs of drilling, reworking, deepening, or plugging back of a particular
well by the operator. . . The penalty may be in terms of acreage, production or
cash. Industry practice in voluntary pooling agreements calls for non-consent
penalties ranging from 200 to 300 percent for development wells. . . " Xd. at
613.
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rendering the risk-penalty excessive, is contradicted by the
weight of the evidence, which in any event must be construed in
favor of the Board' s decisions.

The Oklahoma cases cited by

Bennion express a policy of protecting risk-taking operators
against free-riding non-consenting owners--exactly the opposite
of the policy advocated by Bennion.

None of Bennion' s

constitutional rights have been impaired here.
The Board' s modification of its 1981 order force pooling
Bennion' s interests in the unit, in order to impose the riskpenalty upon Bennion, is within its statutory authority.
Although the Conservation Act does not expressly mention
modification of pooling orders, such power is impliedly within
the Board' s authority.

At the time of the 1981 order, infill

wells such as the Miles Well were not permitted by statute or
rule.

Since that time, new geologic evidence has made it clear

that second wells may be necessary to accomplish the statutory
goal of ensuring maximum recovery of oil underlying drilling
units in this area.

This new evidence resulted in amendment of

the Conservation Act and the Board' s 1985 Order authorizing
second wells on drilling units in the Altamont field.

It makes

no sense to deny the Board authority to modify its previous
orders to take into account increased geologic knowledge and
statutory and regulatory changes.
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The issue of "wellbore" pooling raised by Bennion is
irrelevant.

Bennion confuses the vesting of ownership interests

in the unit upon creation of the drilling unit with the
imposition of cost penalties upon his proportionate share of
costs.

Bennion has no vested right to obtain a free ride upon

the drilling of a second well.
The risk-penalty statute, and its application here, are
necessary to fulfill the legislative purpose of encouraging
prudent development while protecting the correlative rights of
owners.

Bennion' s correlative rights are not impaired.

He could

have obtained his share of production without suffering any
penalty simply by participating in the drilling of the well.
chose not to pursue that course.

The risk-penalty removes

disincentives to risk-taking in the drilling of wells, while
protecting correlative rights.

It fulfills the legislative

purpose of the Conservation Act, and should be upheld by the
Supreme Court.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE NON-CONSENT PENALTY, AND
ITS APPLICATION TO BENNION
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD BY THIS COURT
A.

The Supreme Court Must Give Great Deference to Legislative
Exercise of the Police Power.
The Utah Legislature has expressly and clearly

determined that the prudent development of Utah' s oil and gas
resources is in the public interest.

Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1

provides:
It is declared to be in the public interest to
foster, encourage, and promote the development,
production, and utilization of natural resources
of oil and gas in the State of Utah in such a
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and
to provide for the operation and development of
oil and gas properties in such a manner that a
greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be
obtained and that the correlative rights of all
owners may be fully protected; to provide
exclusive state authority over oil and gas
exploration and development as regulated under
the provisions of this chapter; to encourage,
authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements
for cycling, recycling, pressure maintenance,
and secondary recovery operations in order that
the greatest possible economic recovery of oil
and gas may be obtained within the state to the
end that the land owners, the royalty owners,
the producers, and the general public may
realize and enjoy the greatest possible good
from these vital natural resources.
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The Utah Legislature has chosen to f u l f i l l

t h i s s t a t u t o r y purpose

through the enactment of the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act of
1983, Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 through -18.
Although t h i s court has not had occasion to r u l e upon
the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Utah' s o i l and gas conservation
l e g i s l a t i o n , both federal and s t a t e courts have uniformly upheld
s i m i l a r conservation l e g i s l a t i o n as a valid exercise of the
police power.

See e. a. Hunter Co. v. McHuah, 320 U. S. 222, 64

S. Ct. 19, 22 (1943); Miller v. Corporation Comm' n. , 635 P. 2d
1006, 1007 (Okla. 1981); £££ also Annot. , Validity of Compulsory
Pooling or Unitization Statutes, 37 A. L. R. 2d 434 (1954).
Bennion contends t h a t the r i s k - p e n a l t y provisions of the
forced pooling s t a t u t e s e t forth in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)
are u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l both f a c i a l l y and as applied to him.

These

provisions are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Utah Legislature' s
s t a t u t o r y attempt to encourage o i l and gas production.

By

rewarding those who r i s k t h e i r time and c a p i t a l on the i n h e r e n t l y
u n c e r t a i n venture of d r i l l i n g o i l and gas wells, while
discouraging "free-riding 1 1 by non-consenting owners, the r i s k penalty provisions encourage operators to undertake prudent
development of the s t a t e ' s o i l and gas resources.

3

3

The Supreme

The d i s i n c e n t i v e s to o i l and gas development created by the "free-ride"
system advocated by Bennion are discussed in B. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and
U n i t i z a t i o n : State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, J. Energy L. &
Pol'y 265 (1986). See a l s o Section I . B . , infra.
-12fl:\woc\160\OOOOQrrs.W51

Court should give substantial deference to the Utah Legislature' s
choice of specific means to advance the public welfare.
v. King, 661 P. 2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983).

Bastian

The adjustment and

accommodation of conflicting interests, such as those involved
here, are for the Legislature rather than the courts to resolve.
Id.

Amici believe that the risk-penalty provisions represent a

reasonable legislative accommodation of conflicting interests.
The statute, and its application in the instant case by the
Board, should be given great deference by the Supreme Court.

B.

The Risk-Penalty System Is Rationally Related to Reasonable
Legislative Goals.
The risk-penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-

6(6) are not unconstitutional on their face, and the Board's
order applying the statute to Bennion in this instance does not
violate his due process rights.

In disposing of due process

challenges to legislative enactments, this court has noted the
tolerance with which it views economic legislation such as that
being attacked here:
The almost universal opinion that substantive
due process was abused in invalidating economic
regulations in the first third of this century
has culminated in a rational basis test so
tolerant that the substantive content of
economic statutes rarely violates due process
. . The presumption of constitutionality applied
in these cases is further assurance that
economic regulations will rarely be upset as
violative of substantive due process.
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Wells v. Children' s Aid Society of Utah. 681 P. 2d 199, 205 (Utah
1984)(citations omitted).
In order to s u s t a i n economic l e g i s l a t i o n , the court
needs only to find t h a t the law bears a reasonable r e l a t i o n to a
l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e purpose.
(10th Cir.

Murphv v. Matheson, 742 F. 2d 564,575

1984), c i t i n g Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland. 437

U.S. 117, 125, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (1978). 4

The r i s k penalty

s t a t u t e i s c l e a r l y and r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e
purpose, and any detrimental effect upon Bennion' s i n t e r e s t i s
far outweighed by the benefits of applying the s t a t u t e in
s i t u a t i o n s such as t h i s .
Bennion does not challenge the legitimacy of the
l e g i s l a t i v e purpose expressed i n the Conservation Act - the
encouragement of prudent development of Utah' s petroleum
reserves, while p r o t e c t i n g c o r r e l a t i v e r i g h t s .

This purpose is

served by imposing a r i s k - p e n a l t y upon non-consenting owners
pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6).
The concept of a r i s k - p e n a l t y i s simple.

If the owner

of an i n t e r e s t i n a d r i l l i n g unit chooses not t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n
the d r i l l i n g of a well on the unit, t h a t owner incurs no
4

The scope of due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s under A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 7 of the Utah
C o n s t i t u t i o n has been considered comparable t o t h a t under S e c t i o n 1 of the
F o u r t e e n t h Amendment to the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . In re N.H.B.. 777 P. 2d
487, 489 n. 3 (Utah App. 1989).
Federal cases i n t e r p r e t i n g the Fourteenth
Amendment due p r o c e s s c l a u s e support the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t economic l e g i s l a t i o n
need only r e l a t e r a t i o n a l l y to a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e purpose. See e . g . Murphy v.
Matheson. s u p r a .
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liability or expense whatsoever for the costs of a dry hole.

The

non-consenting owner' s proportionate share of the drilling costs
is instead borne by the participating parties.

If production is

achieved, the participating owners, who took the entire risk of a
dry hole, are rewarded for the risk by recouping a premium in
addition to the non-consenting owner' s proportionate share of
costs.

This premium is recovered from the non-consenting owner' s

share of production from the well.

Thus, under the Utah statute

the non-consenting owner bears no downside risk.

If the well is

dry or sub-economic, the non-consenting owner pays nothing.

If

the well is successful, the non-consenting owner makes no out-ofpocket expenditure.
of,

Rather his share of costs is recouped out

and only out of, production.

However, he must pay a premium

for having avoided risk if the well produces.

The consenting

owners bear all downside risk, but are compensated for that risk
if their decision to drill proves justified.
Bennion' s position is that he should bear no risk for a
dry hole should he choose in advance not to participate, but
should receive all production attributable to his proportionate
interests if the well is successful, without any risk-penalty.
This position is aptly described by analogy in Kramer, Compulsory
Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with
Uncooperative Owners, 7 Journal of Energy L. & Pol' v 255 (1986).
Kramer hypothesizes a gambler offering the reader $3,000,000 to
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be wagered as directed by the gambler.

If the wager is

successful, the reader keeps all winnings beyond the original
$3,000,000.
nothing.

If the wager fails, the reader owes the gambler

Id. at 255.
Kramer notes that while no rational gambler would ever

make this offer, it is the situation applying in the absence of a
risk-penalty.

The non-consenting owner would receive a "free

ride," bearing no risks, but sharing all winnings.

Bennion' s

position, if adopted, would give individual owners a clear
incentive not to participate in the drilling of wells.
Participating would place the owner' s capital at risk in the
event of a dry hole, while all of the benefits of a productive
well would be available without taking this risk.

The unit

operator, on the other hand, would be discouraged from drilling
if it had to incur all of the dry hole risks while being forced
to share the benefits of a successful well with those who had
borne none of the risks.

Id. at 264.

This situation would

discourage rather than encourage oil and gas production, and
directly thwart the legislative purpose of promoting development
of the state7 s oil and gas reserves.
A number of major oil-producing states other than Utah
have adopted the risk-penalty approach, including, among others,
Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, and Texas.
See e. a. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116 (7) (b); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
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§ 30: 10A(2); Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-7(2)(g); Mont. Code Ann. §
82-11-202(2)(b); N. M. Stat Ann. § 70-2-17(c); Tex Nat. Res. Code.
Ann.

§ 102.052.

Despite substantial litigation involving these

statutes, the constitutionality of risk penalties has not been
challenged in any reported decision.

See 1 B. Kramer & P.

Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization §12.03 (3d Ed. 1990).
Further indication of the reasonableness of the riskpenalty approach is found in its prevalence in private
transactions.

Standard form unit operating agreements, used

throughout the oil and gas industry, permit working interest
owners not to participate in drilling or reworking activities
conducted on the unit.

However, if they do choose not to

participate, a variable risk penalty is imposed if production
results from the activities.

See e. a. AAPL 610 Model Form

Operating Agreement, Art. VI (1989).

Risk penalties are an

accepted method of apportioning risk in private contracts
negotiated freely and at arms length.

The Utah Legislature' s

adoption of the risk-penalty approach is rationally related to
the legitimate purpose of facilitating oil and gas development in
the State of Utah.

Amici believe that Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)

promotes economic rationality by penalizing those who would "free
ride" upon the risk-taking of others.
should be upheld by this court.
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The risk-penalty statute

II.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE RISK-PENALTY UPON
BENNION IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
A.

Substantial Evidence Supports The Board/ s Decision.
Bennion contends that the Board' s imposition of a risk-

penalty upon him is unconstitutional under the specific factual
circumstances of this case.

Bennion7 s primary contention is that

the risk-penalty is excessive given the risks of the well
involved, and therefore unconstitutionally unreasonable. 5
Amici agree with Bennion7 s contention that the
percentage of the risk-penalty should be related to the risks of
the well involved.

However, Amici believe that the Board acted

reasonably in assessing the risks here, and that this Court
should be reluctant to accept Bennion7 s invitation to second
guess the Board7 s determination.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) treats different types of
costs differently for penalty purposes.

Costs of surface

equipment, such as tanks and piping, are not subject to any
penalty.

Instead, the operator may recover only its actual co::s

for such equipment from the non-consenting owner.
§ 40-6-6(6)(a).

Utah Code Ann.

The reason for not imposing a penalty in this

Mr. Bennion also contends that his rights in the unit vested at the time
of the original pooling of the unit, and that imposition of a risk penalty on the
second well in the unit impairs his vested rights, in violation of the due
process and takings provisions of the Utah Constitution.
This argument is
discussed in Section II.B., infra.
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s i t u a t i o n i s apparently because surface equipment can be sold if
the well i s a dry hole, thereby reducing the ultimate r i s k to the
operator from i n c u r r i n g such expenses.

This provision i s

exemplary of the care taken by the Utah Legislature to ensure
t h a t the penalty imposed i s linked to the r i s k s a c t u a l l y taken by
the operator.
For d r i l l i n g costs, downhole equipment, and s i m i l a r
items, the operator may recover from the non-consenting owner' s
share of production from 150% to 200% of the non-consenting
owner' s share of the costs.
recovery i s s e t by the Board.

The specific percentage of cost
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)(b). 6

As discussed previously, these amounts may be recovered only from
the non-consenting owner' s share of production.

In the event of

a dry hole, the non-consenting party bears no costs.
Bennion attacks the Board' s determination t h a t ANR
should be permitted to recoup 175% of Bennion' s share of d r i l l i n g
costs from his share of production from the Miles Well.

His

basis for doing so i s t h a t the r i s k of d r i l l i n g a dry hole at
t h i s l o c a t i o n i s " p r a c t i c a l l y zero" and t h a t , therefore, the 75%
penalty i s unreasonably high.

Bennion Brief at 19.

This

argument presents an u n r e a l i s t i c view of the r i s k s of d r i l l i n g
b

The court should note that the 150%-200% range set forth in the s t a t u t e ,
and the 175% figure referred to by Mr. Bennion, are percentages of costs
incurred. A penalty i s imposed only to the extent the percentage exceeds 100%;
the penalty imposed by the Board in t h i s case i s 75%. Mr. Bennion*s a s s e r t i o n
that the Board has imposed a 175% penalty i s therefore misleading.
-19g: \wpc\160\00000rrs.W51

the Miles 2-1B5 well, and would require this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of the Board.
Bennion supports his argument with selective excerpts
from the testimony of Mr. David Laramie, a petroleum landman
employed by ANR.

As Bennion points out, Mr. Laramie did indicate

that ANR had not drilled any dry holes in Duchesne County, and
that the only other well within the specific unit had been
economic.

Bennion Brief at 19; May 24, 1990 transcript at 30.

Yet Bennion fails to cite the more extensive testimony of Mr.
Laramie concerning the risks of drilling an uneconomic well.
Perhaps most telling is the decision of interest owners
holding over 30% of the interests in the unit to "go non-consent"
on the well.

Those parties, unlike Bennion, had voluntarily

executed the unit operating agreement for the well.
transcript at 13-14, 22.

May 24, 1990

The operating agreement provides that

parties choosing not to participate in a well have 300% of their
proportionate share of costs recouped by the participating
parties.

May 24, 1990 transcript at 22.

The operating

agreement, freely entered by the parties to it, therefore
provides for a non-consent penalty more than twice that imposed
by the Board upon Bennion.7

Yet the nonparticipating parties

Under the operating agreement, the participating parties recoup 300% of
non-participating parties proportionate costs; or a penalty of 200%. Under the
Board's order, ANR can recoup 175% of Mr. Bennion*s proportionate share of costs,
or a 75% penalty.
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assessed the risks of the well as high enough that they would
incur this penalty rather than participate in the well.

If the

well were a sure winner, as Bennion asserts, this decision would
be irrational.

While the risk of a dry hole may not have been

large in this instance, it was indisputably present.
wells is inherently risky.

Drilling

At the very best, a substantial risk

existed that the proposed well, while not dry, might have been
insufficiently productive to return the participating parties'
entire investment.

May 24, 1990 transcript at 30-31, 53-54.

As

another example, all drilling involves a risk of encountering
unexpected mechanical problems that can force abandonment of a
well.

May 24, 1990 transcript at 30; see also

Compulsory Pooling, supra, at 266.

Kramer,

Drilling for oil and gas is

not, and is likely never to be, an endeavor guaranteed to
succeed.

The imposition of a risk penalty, even if a dry hole

were improbable, was reasonable given these unavoidable
realities.
The cases cited by Bennion do not dictate a different
conclusion.

The South Dakota Supreme Court' s decision in In Re

Kohlman, 263 N. W. 2d 674 (S. D. 1978), upheld a regulatory decision
imposing a 100% penalty (as opposed to the 75% penalty imposed on
Bennion), based upon the presence of a producing well 3/4 mile
away.

In Windsor Gas Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 529 S. W.

2d 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), the Court upheld a regulatory
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finding that a 200% penalty was unreasonable under the
circumstances, based upon the long productive history of the
surrounding field.8

In both instances, the determination of the

regulatory body was a factual one, and was upheld by the
reviewing court.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has similarly deferred to
the findings of its Oil Conservation Commission in determining
the reasonable extent of a risk-penalty in particular
circumstances.

In Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation

Comm/ n, 672 P. 2d 280 (N. M. 1983), the court stated in upholding a
risk-penalty order of the Commission:
We must view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to
support the findings, and any evidence not
favorable will not be considered. . . Special
weight will be given to the experience,
technical competence, and specialized knowledge
of the Commission.
672 P. 2d at 282.
Bennion seeks t o t u r n a disagreement with the Board' s
f a c t u a l determination i n t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claim.

Risks e x i s t e d

for ANR i n the d r i l l i n g of the Miles 2-1B5 well, as they e x i s t
for every well.

The Board heard evidence from both s i d e s , and

made a determination concerning the r i s k - p e n a l t y t o be applied

8

Under Texas law, the proponent of a well must make a "fair and reasonable"
offer to nonconsenting owners before the Texas Railroad Commission (the Texas
equivalent of the Utah Board of O i l , Gas & Mining) obtains j u r i s d i c t i o n over an
a p p l i c a t i o n to force-pool the non-consenting owners i n t e r e s t .
Tex. Nat. Res.
Code Ann. §102.013(b).
-22-

under the circumstances.

The findings of administrative agencies

within the areas of their technical expertise should be given
Amici believe that the Board7 s

deference by reviewing courts.

decision in this matter is reasonable, and should be upheld.

B.

The Oklahoma Cases Cited bv Bennion Support RMOGA' s
Position.
Bennion also contends that his rights in the unit vested

as of the time of the original forced pooling order for the unit,
and that the Board' s order imposing a risk-penalty for the second
well unconstitutionally violates those vested rights.

The cases

relied upon by Bennion support an opposite conclusion.

Bennion

relies entirely in this claim upon a line of Oklahoma cases
culminating in two similar cases involving Amoco Production
Company.

Amoco ProflygtiQh Comply v. Corporation Comrn' n pf

Oklahoma, 751 P. 2d 203, 207 (Okla. App. 1986) ["Amoco I"]; Amoco
Production Company v. Corporation Comm' n of Oklahoma, 752 P. 2d
835 (Okla. App. 1987)["Amoco II"].

The Amoco cases, and the

other Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion, do involve the protection
of vested rights.

However, the rights protected by the Oklahoma

courts have been those of unit operators, against free-riding
interest owners such as Bennion.

If this Court applies the

reasoning contained in the Oklahoma cases, it must deny Bennion' s
petition.
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In order to understand the Oklahoma cases, it is
initially necessary to understand a peculiarity of Oklahoma law
not found in the Utah Conservation Act.

In Oklahoma, unleased

interest owners such as Bennion have an election at the time an
initial well is proposed for a unit.

The interest owner must

either participate proportionately in the cost of the well or
permanently forfeit his entire interest in the unit in return for
a cash bonus or overriding royalty.

See Kramer, supra, at 274-5.

No provision is made for the non-consenting owner to retain any
interest in the unit after payment of a risk-penalty.

I_&.

All the Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion essentially
involve an attempt by a non-consenting owner to participate in a
second well after going non-consent, and accepting a bonus, on
the first well.

For example, in Amoco I, the Oklahoma

Corporation Commission force-pooled a 640 acre drilling and
spacing unit, and designated Amoco the operator of that unit.
Amoco I. 751 P. 2d at 203.

An interest owner, R&R Exploration

Company, chose not to participate in an initial well proposed by
Amoco for the unit.

1^.

R&R Exploration, pursuant to the terms

of the pooling order, received a 1/8 royalty on production, and
was relieved of any obligation to contribute to the costs of the
well.

!£.

The well was successful, and Amoco then planned

another well for the unit.

L&.

A successor in interest to R&R,
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Bartex Exploration, then requested to participate in the second
well.

L&.
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission granted this

request, but was reversed by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.

The

court held that once R&R elected not to participate on the first
well, it was permanently divested of all interest in the unit.
Conversely, the rights obtained by Amoco in the unit by virtue of
R&R' s nonparticipation were vested and not subject to later
extinguishment.

751 P. 2d at 207.

The court in large part based

its decision upon the unfairness to the operator of allowing a
non-consenting party to wait until a successful well was drilled,
and then seek to participate:
The original election is based upon certain
information, or lack of information. Good faith
elections were made prior to the first well. It
is not fair or just to alter the positions of
the interest owners after the initial well is
drilled. Once an operator relies on the unit
that the Corporation Commission creates, new
elections deprive the original risk capital
investors of rights earned bv taking the risk of
the initial well. The order of the commission
granting a second election is a deprivation of a
property right of the initial risk capital

investor?,
751 P. 2d at 207 (emphasis added).
All the other Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion are based
upon the same rationale as Amoco I.

By taking the risk of

participating in the initial well, the operator obtains rights in
the unit that should not be divested in favor of previously non-
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consenting owners who seek to participate once the risks are
lower.

See e. g. Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm' n, 767 P. 2d

404 (Okla. 1988); Amoco I. supra: Amoco II, supra: Helmerich &
Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm' n. , 532 P. 2d 419 (Okla. 1975);
Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. , 501 P. 2d 503 (Okla. 1972).

At best

for Bennion, the cases cited by him are distinguishable on the
basis of Oklahoma' s different regulatory scheme.

In the opinion

of amici, the Oklahoma cases seek to achieve the same purpose as
the Utah risk-penalty statute — encouraging development by
removing disincentives to participation.
The Oklahoma regulatory system, although far harsher on
non-consenting parties than Utah' s risk-penalty provisions, has
been upheld against due process and takings challenges.
v. Corporation Commission, 327 P. 2d 699 (Okla. 1957).

Anderson
As

discussed previously, the non-consenting, unleased owner in
Oklahoma must permanently forfeit his interests in the unit in
return for a cash bonus, and has no right whatsoever to
participate in subsequent wells.

Were Oklahoma law in effect

here, Bennion would have received a cash payment prior to the
drilling of the Tew Well, and lost all further rights in the
unit.

Because this payment would have occurred prior to the

discovery of oil, it would have undoubtedly been quite small in
relation to Bennion' s share of production from the two wells
here, even after risk-penalties have been paid.
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The Anderson

court held that this type of regulation did not constitute a
taking of the non-consenting owner' s property, because he had the
right to participate in the well if he wished.

327 P. 2d at 703.

Bennion has not suffered any constitutionally proscribed
loss by the application of the risk-penalty here.

Prior to the

drilling of the Miles Well, he could have participated in the
well on the same terms as any other party simply by paying his
share of proportionate costs.

See Statement of Facts, 11 11.

He

chose instead to let ANR take the risk, thus subjecting himself
to the statutory risk-penalty.
volitional.

Any loss he suffered was strictly

The proper exercise of the state' s police power,

even though it may impair or destroy private property, is neither
a taking nor violative of due process.

See e. a. Alber v. Nolle,

645 P. 2d 456, 461 (N. M. App. 1982); Cougar Business Owner' s Ass' n
v. State, 647 P. 2d 481, 487-88 (Wash. 1982), cert, den. 459 U.S.
971.

The risk-penalty statute is precisely such a proper

exercise of the Utah Legislature' s police power.
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III.
THE BOARD ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN
ITS AUTHORITY IN MODIFYING THE 1981 POOLING ORDER

A.

The Board Had Authority to Modify Its Previous Order Pooling
Interests In the Drilling UnitBennion also contests the Board' s authority to modify

the previous pooling order for the drilling unit to impose the
non-consent penalty for the second well in the unit.
On April 30, 1981, the Board entered its order force
pooling all interests (including Bennion's) in the drilling unit.
The 1981 Order designated the Tew Well as the permitted well for
the drilling unit.

It required Bennion to pay his proportionate

share of costs in the well, without any non-consent penalty.9
See 1981 Oirder H 2-3.

Bennion, for obvious reasons, wishes the

cost allocation stipulation of the 1981 Order to apply, rather
than the 1990 (modified) Order with its risk-penalty provisions.
He therefore contends that the Board had no statutory authority
to modify the 1981 Order to impose a risk-penalty at the time the
second well was drilled on the unit.
Amici believe that Bennion' s position is not only
erroneous, but also would, if adopted, significantly hamper the

y

The 1981 Order was based upon a stipulation of the parties to the forcedpooling action that no penalty would be assessed against Bennion on the Tew Well.
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Board' s ability to regulate oil and gas development in the state
of Utah.

The Conservation Act gives the Board broad authority to

regulate "all operations for and related to the production of oil
or gas . . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(3)(a).

This authority

includes express authority to enter orders "pooling all interests
in the drilling unit for the development and operation [of the
Unit]."

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5).

Bennion argues that because

the statute does not expressly state that pooling orders may be
modified, the Board had no authority to modify its previous order
to impose the non-consent penalty here.
This argument is contrary to law and reason.

The broad

statutory powers of the Board to regulate oil and gas
development, and its specific authority to enter force pooling
orders, give it the inherent power to modify its own pooling
orders.

The authority of administrative agencies is not limited

to those powers expressly granted by statute.

It includes all

powers that may fairly be implied from the statute.
NQW Mexico $t»t9 PQUgg gfl- , 497 P. 2d 968 (N. M.

Wimberly v.

1972); ££& fllgQ

Ricker v. Board of Ed. of Millard County. 396 P. 2d 416 (Utah
1964) (law favors giving agency free hand within its sphere of
responsibilities).

Other state courts have specifically held

that agencies regulating oil and gas development have the power
to modify their own orders.

See Railroad Commission v. Aluminum

Corp. of America. 380 S. W. 2d 599, 602 (Tex. 1964) (regulatory
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agency may modify previous orders upon changed circumstances);
see also Vierson v. Bennett. 353 P. 2d 114, 118-119 (Okla. 1960);
Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. , 244 P. 2d 852, 858 (Okla. 1951).
Given its broad powers to regulate oil and gas development, the
Board has the implied power to modify its own existing pooling
orders.
A contrary conclusion—such as that argued by Bennion-would prevent the Board from reacting to changed circumstances,
and would simply be bad policy.

It is instructive to review how

circumstances changed between the time of the 1981 Order and the
Board's modification of that order.

The 1981 Order did not

address the drilling of additional wells.

Until the 1983

amendment of the Conservation Act, the drilling of additional
wells on a particular unit was not statutorily authorized.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(4).

See

After the Utah Legislature

authorized the drilling of increased density wells on drilling
units in 1983, the Board held hearings and took evidence upon
whether increased density wells were necessary to permit full
recovery of oil and gas underlying drilling units in the
Altamont-Bluebell field.

The Board expressly found that, due to

the discontinuous nature of the productive beds in the Lower
Green River/Wasatch formations, a single well would not
effectively drain the recoverable oil and gas underlying any
given 640 acre spacing unit.

1985 Order, p. 5, U 5-7.
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It

therefore ordered that an additional well could be drilled on
each established drilling unit in the Altamont-Bluebell field. 10
1985 Order, p. 8, 11 B.
These changed circumstances clearly justify the Board's
modification of the 1981 Order, the forced-pooling order, in the
manner it did here.

At the time the 1981 Order was issued,

neither the Board nor the parties contemplated that an additional
well would be necessary to recover all oil underlying the unit.
Now that this fact has been recognized, it does not make sense to
deny the Board the ability to modify its prior orders to take
into account changed circumstances.

The Supreme Court should

uphold the Board' s determination that it had authority to modify
the 1981 Order.

B.

No Vested Rights Were Impaired By the Board' s Action.
Bennion also attacks the Board' s modification of the

1981 Order on the ground that that order vested all interests in
the unit at the time it was entered.

He therefore contends that

it was beyond the authority of the Board to modify his rights as
an owner of the unit at the time the second well was drilled, by
modifying the 1981 Order to impose a non-consent penalty for the
Miles Well.

10

The 1985 order expressly includes the drilling unit in question here.
1985 Order, p. 4.
-31g:\wpc\160\00000rrs.W51

Bennion' s argument is based upon his failure to discern
the difference between the issue of ownership in the unit and the
issue of his obligation to either participate in additional wells
or bear the statutory non-consent penalty.

While his interest in

the drilling unit - his 2. 94898% unleased mineral interest set by
the 1981 Order - could not be modified upon the determination
that a second well should be drilled on the unit, that fact has
no bearing upon his option to participate in the well.
The Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion in support of this
argument are inapposite at best.

Amici have previously discussed

the profound differences between Oklahoma' s regulatory system and
that created by the Utah legislature.

See Section II.B., supra.

In Oklahoma, a non-consenting interest owner forfeits all working
interest in the drilling unit for all time when the unit is
pooled, in return for a one-time cash bonus or an overriding
royalty.

All the Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion have involved

attempts by originally non-consenting owners such as Bennion to
participate in a second well after an initial successful well on
the unit.

See e. a. , Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. supra, 501 P. 2d

at 507; Amoco I, 751 P. 2d at 207; Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation
Comm' n. supra. 767 P. 2d at 405.

The Oklahoma Courts have

consistently held that, in order to protect the risk-taking
operator, non-consenting owners must be denied any participation
in second wells on the drilling unit.
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Amoco I, supra. 751 P. 2d

at 207.

The non-consenting owner chose not to risk participation

in the first well when the risks were high; he should not be
allowed to participate when an initial discovery well has reduced
the risks of a second well. !£.

This is the reason Oklahoma

courts have disapproved of "wellbore" pooling - it can permit
non-consenting owners to free-ride upon the risk-taking of
others.
The Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion can therefore
readily be distinguished, both on the basis of Oklahoma' s
radically different regulatory system and of the policy reflected
in the decisions.

Amici believe that the

lt

wellbore,, pooling

issue raised by Bennion is simply irrelevant.

It seems

undisputed by any party to this appeal that the ownership
interests of the parties were fixed at the time of the original
pooling.

The Board' s order imposing the non-consent penalty in

this case did not change those interests in any way.

Bennion' s

ownership interest in the unit has not been impaired; he has
simply been required to pay a penalty, based upon his unchanged
proportionate interest, because he chose not to participate in
the drilling of the Miles well.

C.

The BQflrfl Ne$fl NQt Mjikq Any Finding Qf Economic Feasibility
Prior to Allowing Second Wells.
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The 1985 Order, which permitted second wells to be
drilled on existing units in the Altamont and Bluebell fields,
provided in part as follows:
C. Additional wells may be drilled at the
option of the operator of the unit, based upon
geologic and engineering data for that unit
which will justify the drilling of an additional
well in order to recover additional oil,
provided the additional well appears to be
economically feasible.
D. Economic feasibility means that a
prudent operator would have a reasonable
opportunity to recover the costs of drilling,
completing, producing and operating the well,
plus a reasonable profit.
1985 Order, H C-D, at 8.
Bennion argues that this language requires the operator
to provide data to the Board concerning the economic feasibility
of infill wells on the units covered by the 1985 Order and
requires the Board to make a positive finding of economic
feasibility prior to authorizing infill wells11.
The 1983 amendments to the Conservation Act do not
require the Board to approve the drilling of infill wells on
existing units, and the 1985 order provides that second wells may
be drilled at the option of the operator.

Amici believe that

this determination should be left to the operator, rather than
requiring a determination by the Board of economic feasibility.

n

The court should note the contradiction between Bennion*s argument that
the Miles Well was essentially risk free, and his apparent belief that the well
was not economically feasible.
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Unit operators will not choose to spend a million dollars or more
on a second well unless they perceive it to be economic.

A

requirement that they prove economic feasibility before the Board
would seem redundant.

Operators are in the best position to

determine economic feasibility.

Amici believe that this decision

does not require Board supervision.

IV.
THE BOARD'S ORDER IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE STATUTORY
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST

The public interest expressed in the legislative
statement of purpose set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 is
served by the Board' s order.

Bennion insists that his

correlative rights to produce his share of oil and gas from the
pool have in some way been violated.

Bennion Brief at 36.

While

protection of correlative rights is indeed one of the
legislature' s goals12, Bennion' s rights have not been violated
here.
The pooling orders in question do deprive Bennion of his
common law rights to drill a well to produce his share of the

^Bennion conveniently neglects to mention the equally important legislative
goal of encouraging development of Utah* oil and gas resources. As Amici have
discussed in this brief, the positions advocated by Bennion would create
disincentives to development of the resource, in derogation of the legislative
purpose.
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petroleum underlying the unit.

Yet in order to protect his

correlative rights, he need only be given the right to
participate in the well(s) being drilled by the unit operator.
Anderson v. Corporation Comm' n. , supra, 32 7 P. 2d at 70 3; see also
Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. , supra, 501 P. 2d at 507.

Bennion,

prior to the drilling of both the Tew and Miles Wells, had this
right.

He could have received his proportionate share of

production without penalty simply by agreeing to participate in
the drilling of the wells.

He chose not to exercise this option.

His correlative rights have been protected.

CONCLUSION
The risk-penalty provisions of the Conservation Act
provide a rational and economically sound method of promoting oil
and gas development in the State of Utah.

Drilling for oil and

gas is inherently a risky and expensive proposition.

Bennion, in

seeking to invalidate the risk-penalty, wishes to avoid the risks
involved in this activity, while sharing all of the benefits.
His position, if adopted by the Supreme Court as the law of Utah,
would deter unit operators from taking the risks necessary to
develop Utah' s oil and gas resources.

Bennion similarly urges

this Court to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the Board7 s
authority and actions in the very areas it was legislatively
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created to regulate.

Amici believe that the Board acted legally,

properly and within its authority.

The positions taken by

Bennion represent bad policy and bad law.

His appeal should be

denied.
DATED this 8th day of March, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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Attorneys for Amici Curiae
50 South Main Street, #1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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ADDENDUM # 1

EXHIBIT "A"

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE HATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF S, E. BENNION FOR AN ORDER
POOLING INTEREST IN THE DRILLING
UNIT COMPRISED OF SECTION 1,
TOVrNSHIP 2 SOUTH OF RANGE 5 WEST,
UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN, DUCHESNE
COUNTY, UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER
Cause No. 139-13

This cause came on for hearing before the Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, the State
of Utah, at 10:00 a.m., on Thursday, July 26, 1979, in the
:xecutive Conference Room, Holiday Inn, 1659 West North Temple,
lalt Lake City, Utah, pursuant to the Amended Application of
>. H. Bennion {*Bennion") and to notice to all interested parlies duly and regularly given by the Board, to consider forced
pooling of the uncommitted interest of Bennion in the above:aptioned drilling unit, and other matters as set forth in the
Amended Application -and -Notice -of Hearing.
The following members of the Board were present:
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman
Edward T. Beck
C. Ray Juvelin
E. Steele Mclntyre
John L. Bell
Also present and representing the Division:
Cleon B. Feight, Director
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant
Frank M. Hamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer

Michael, Minder, Geological Engineer
Denise A, Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney Ge*<
Appearances were made as follows:
S. H, Bennion, for himself
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
Gregory T. 'Williams, Counsel tor S>.ell Oil Company
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, State
of Utah, on October 24, 1979, at the Wildlife Resources Auditorium, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The following Board members were pre*

t:

Charles R. Henderson, Chairman
John L. Bell
C. Ray Juvelin
E, Steele Mclntyre
Constance K. Lundberg
Edward T, Beck
Also present and representing the Division:
Cleon B, Feight, Director
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant
Frank M. Haraner, Chief Petroleum Engineer
Michael Minder, Geological Engineer
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Asiistant Attorney Genera
Appearances were made as follows:
5. H. Bennion, for himself
peter Stirba, Counsel for S. R. Bennion
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company

This cause also came on for hearing before the Board
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, State
of Utah, on December 18, 1980, at the Wildlife Resources Auditorium, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The following Board members were present:
John L. Bell, Co-Chairman
Charles Henderson
Thadis W. Box
E. Steele Mclntyre
C. Ray Juvelin
Also present and representing the Division:
Cleon B. Feight, Director
Ron Daniels, Coordinator
Mike Minder, Petroleum Engineer
Paula Frank, Secretary
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney Genera
Appearances were made as follows:
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. H. Benr.ion
Lowell Kirkpatrick, for Shell Oil Company
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
NOW, THERFORE, the Board, having considered the >
matters presented at said hearings and the remarks and the
stipulations of counsel, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS
1,

That due and regular notice of the time, place,

and purpose of said hearings was given to all interested parties in the form and manner and within the time required by lav

2.

That the Board has jurisdiction over the matters

covered by the Amended Application and all of the parties
interested therein, and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate
the Order hereinafter set forth.
3.

That Bennicn is the record owner of an unleased,

undivided one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas and minerals located in the NEV SWk and NW>i SE*x of Section 1, Township
2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special Meridian, Duchesne
County, Utah,
4.

That by Order in Cause No. 139-3, entered June 24,

1971, as amended by Order in Cause No. 139-8, entered September,
20, 1972, the Board established said Section 1, Township 2
South, Range 5 West, Unitah Special Meridian, as a drilling and
spacing unit for the production of oil, gas, and associated
hydrocarbons from the spaced interval described in said orders;
that Shell Oil Company has drilled the TEW 1-1S5 well in said
Section 1 which is producing from said interval and is the permitted well for said drilling unit.
5.

That said Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5

West, Uintah Special Meridian, contains 678.2 acres; and that
Bennion's interest in said drilling and spacing unit is a
2.948981 interest.
6.

That Shell is the major working interest owner and.

is the sole operator within said drilling unit; and that Shell
is willing to let Bennion share in the proceeds of production
of said unit from first production.
7.

That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this

cause dated March 26, 1980, all interests in the drilling unit
comprised of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah

Special Meridian, in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County,
Utah, were pooled for the development and operation of said
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights,
effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 25, 1979.
That Bennionfs proportionate share of the net rev

8.

enue from the production of the subject well up to 6:00 a.m.,
Mountain Daylight time on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41 which
consists of the following:
Working Interest Accumulations
Revenue
Oil

$101,608.86

Gas

3,482.23

Total

105,091.09

Expenditures

47,203.16

NET

$57,887.93

Royalty Interest Accumulations*
Oil

$13,872.44

Gas

462.04

Total

$14,334.48

Total Accumulations
Working Interest

$57,887.93

Royalty Interest

14,334.48

Total

$72,222.41

(•Based on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately reduced, until payout.

Upon payout this royalty merges with and

is included in the working interest.)
9.

That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this

cause dated March 26, 1980, Shell paid the Division of Oil, Gas,
and Mining the sum of $72,222.41 which sum was placed in a

5-

six-month money market certificate as directed by counsel for
Bennion and Shell; that the original certificate earned interest in the amount of $3,917.69; and that the original sum and
interest were invested in a new certificate which bears interest at the rate of 13.519* and will mature on Kay 6, 1S81.
10.

That Bennion has conducted an audit of Shell's

records relating to the subject well at Shell's offices in
Houston, Te--:

and has submitted a report relating to such

audit to the Board.
11.

That it is the practice of the industry to con-

duct an audit of an operator's records at the office where the
operator maintains such records; and that there are standard
accounting procedures in the industry relating to such audits.

oapra
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY TEE BOARD:
1.

That all interests in the drilling unit comprised

of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special
Meridian, in the Xltamont Field of Duchesne County, Utah, be aq
the same are pooled for the development and operation of said
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights,
effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979.
2.

That the TEW 1-1B5 well located in said Section 1

is the permitted well for said drilling unit.
3.

That Bennion is entitled to receive from Shell

Bennion's proportionate share of production of oil, gas liquids, and natural gas in-kind produced from the subject well
from and after 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979
upon payment of Bennion's proportionate share of the monthly

operating expense of said well; that Shell will tender Bennion
invoices for his proportionate share of the monthly operating
expense in the same manner and in the same detail as if Bennion
had signed the Operating Agreement in effect fcr said unit;
that in the event Bennion fails to pay his proportionate share
of the monthly operating expense within 15 days of invoice,
Shell shall have a first and preferred lien on Bennion's interest in production and shall be entitled to withhold the amount
of said production in an amount equal to Bennion's share of the
operating expense plus interest at the prevailing rate until
such payment is received; and that should such default continue
for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of invoice, Shell
shall be entitled to retain Bennion's proportionate share of
production to the extent of Shell's lien or to tender the production withheld pursuant to Shell's lien to Bennion and pursue
other available legal remedies.
4.

That Bennion's interest in said drilling unit is a

2.94898% interest.
5.

That Bennion is not entitled to share in production

occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time on July

2b,

1979, in-kind but is entitled to share in the proceeds of such
production; that the amount to which Bennion is entitled with
respect to production occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain
Daylight time on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41; and that the Board
shall transfer ownership of the money market certificate purchasec
pursuant to the Interim Order dated March 26, 1980, to Bennion. I:
addition, Shell shall pay Bennion the sum of $2,S04.00, representing interest at 6 percent per annum on Bennion's statutory royalt>
interest for the period from first production until the purchase
of the original money market certificate.
*6.

That any further audit of Shell's records relating

to the subject drilling unit which Bennion wishes to conduct

shall be performed at Bennion's expense at the location at vhic!
such records are kept; and that any such audit shall be conducted pursuant t~ the accounting procedures of the industry.
DATED this ^lS

O\o^j

day of

, 1981

'J
STATS OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
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ADDENDUM #2

EXHIBIT "B"

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDED
PETITION OF AMR LIMITED INC.,
ET AL. FOR AN ORDER MODIFYING
PREVIOUS ORDERS WHICH
ESTABLISHED DRILLING AND
SPACING UNITS AND ANY OTHER
ORDERS RELATING TO TEST WELLS
FOR THE-AlTAMONT, BLUEBELL
AMD'.CEDAR RIM-SINK DRAW
FIELDS, DUCHESNE AND UINTAH
COUNTIES, UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
Docket No. 85-.0C7
Cause No. 1 3 9 - 4 2

Pursuant t o t h e Amended N o t i c e of Eearing dared March
4 , 1985 of t h e Board of O i l , Gas and Mining ("Board"),

Department

of Natu, :ai R e s o u r c e s of t h e S t a t e of Utah, s a i d cause came en f c :
h e a r i n g on Thursday, April 1 1 , 1985 a t 1 0 : 0 0 a.m. in t h e Beard
Root:, of t h e D i v i s i o n of O i l , Gas and Mining ( " D i v i s i o n " ) ,
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West No, :th Temple, 3 Triad C e n t e r , S u i t e 3 0 1 , S a l t Lake C i t y ,
Utah.
The f o l l o w i n g

members of t h e Board v e r e p r e s e n t :

Gregory P. W i l l i a m s , Chairman
James W. Carter
C h a r l e s P.. Henderson
Richard B. Larson
E. S t e e l e Mclntyre
John H. Garr, having r e c u s e d h i m s e l f ,
did not p a r t i c i p a t e

Mark C. Moench, Assistant Attorney General, was present
on behalf of the Board,
Members of the Staff of the Division present and
participating in the hearing included:
Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director
John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer
Barbara W. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, was
present on behalf of the Division.
Appearances were made as follows:

Petitioners AKR

Limited/ ££ £1./ by Frank Douglass, Esq. and Ray E. Lar.cenberc,
Austin, Texas; Robert G. Pruitt, Jr., Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah;
Frank J. Gustin, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah; Louis A. Pcsekany,
Jr., General Counsel, and George W.

Eeiistrom, Esq., ANR

Production Company; Phillip K. Chattin, General Counsel, Ctsx Oil
Company; Hugh C. Garner, Esq., for Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation;
Phillip William Lear, Esq., for Phillips Petroleum Company;
Jeffrey R. Young, Esq., for Bow Valley Petroleum, Inc.; E. J.
Lewis, Esq., Vice President, and Robert W. Adkins, Esq., Linmar
Energy Corporation; Robert Buettner, Esq., Koch Exploration
Company; Lane Jamison, Esq., Sonat Exploration Company; Vic-or
Brown and Robert Brown, Utah Royalty Association; John Earja,
Esq., Gulf Oil Corporation; Martin Seneca, General Counsel, Ute^
Indian Tribe; Assad H. Raffoul, Petroleum Engineer, Bureau of
Land Management; John Chasel, on his own behalf; George Morris,
Esc.r Ute Distribution Corporation; Dr. Gilbert Miller,
Conservation Superintendent, Anarada Hess Corporation; and L. A.
Pike, Roosevelt, Utah, landowner.

Now t h e r e f o r e , the Board having considered t h e
t e s t i m o n y of t h e w i t n e s s e s , John C. Osmond, Petroleum Geologist;
Clarke G i l l e s p i e , Petroleum Reservoir Engineer; and R. Thayr.e
Robson, Economist, for P e t i t i o n e r s and B. J . Lewis, Vice
P r e s i d e n t , and John W. Clark, Petroleum Engineer, for Linmar
Energy C o r p o r a t i o n , and the e x h i b i t s r e c e i v e d a t s a i d hearing and
being f u l l y a d v i s e d in t h e p r e m i s e s , now makes and e n t e r s the
following:

1.

Due and r e g u l a r n o t i c e of t h e t i m e , place and

purpose cf t h e h e a r i n g was given t o a l l i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s as
r e q u i r e s by law and t h e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e Board.
2.

The Eoard has j u r i s d i c t i o n over the m a t t e r s covered

by s a i d n o t i c e and over a i l p a r t i e s i n t e r e s t e d t h e r e i n and has
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make and promulgate any order h e r e i n a f t e r

3.

set

The Board has h e r e t o f o r e e n t e r e d 640 a c r e d r i l l i n g

and s p a c i n g o r d e r s for t h e Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation in
Causes No. 1 3 9 - 3 , 1 3 9 - 4 , 1 3 9 - 5 , 1 3 9 - 8 , and 139-17

(Altaaor.r

F i e l d ) , Causes No. 1 3 1 - 1 1 , 131-14, 1 3 1 - 2 4 , 1 3 1 - 2 7 , 131-32, 1313 3 , 1 3 1 - 3 4 , 131-45 and 1 3 1 - 5 5 , ( B l u e b e l l F i e l d ) , and Causes No.
140-6 and 140-7 (Cedar Rim-Sink Draw F i e l d ) as t o t h e following
described lands :
UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN
Sections:

19-36

Towncrnn 1 N o r t h , Ranop ? Wpst
Sections:
19-36
T o w n s h i p i N o r t h , Rsngp 7 W P ^
S e c t i o n s 2 3 - 2 6 , 35 and 36
T o u n s h i o 1 S o u t h , Rar.ne 1 F a c t
S e c t i o n s : All (except Roosevelt

Unit)

T o w n s h i p 1 S o u t h , Ranee 7 E a s t
Sections:
4 - 8 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 30-31
Tcvrisr.ip 1 S o u t h , RS"CP 1 West
S e c t i o n s : Ail (except Roosevelt

Unit)

T o w n s h i p 1 S o u t h , Ranee 7 ' t h r o u g h i Wept
Sections:
Ail
Township 1 S o u t h , P.ance 5 West
Sections:
1 0 - 1 7 , 20-36
T o w n s h i p 1 P o p t h . Rang* fi West
Sections:
2 5 - 2 6 , 35-36
T o w n s h i p 2 S o u t h , R a r c e 1 t h r o u g h 7 Fa«t
Sections:
Ail
Township 2 S o u t h ,
Sections:
All

Ranee 1 t h r o u c h 6 West

T o w n s h i p 7 So-'th , Ran.ce 7 West
Sections:
1 9 , 30-36
T o w n s h i p ? S o u t h , Range fl West
Sections:
23-26, 31-36
Township 3 S o u t h , Range 3 West
S e c t i o n s : 5-S, 1 7 - 2 0 , 29-32
T o w n s h i p 3 S o u t h . Ranee 4 t h r o u g h R Wegt
Sections:
All
T o w n s h i p A S o u t h . Range 3 West

Sections:

5 and 6

T o w n s h i p 4 S o u t h . Ranee 4 West
Sections:
1-6
Tnwncnip 4 S o u t h . Ran O P g West
Sections:
1-6

T o w n s h i p 4 S o u t h , P.ar.ce 6 West
Sections:
1-18
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Townchip 5 S o u t h , ^ n c e 19 E a s t
Sections:
20-23, 2 6 - 2 3 , 32-35
T o w n s h i p 6 S o u t h , R ^ C P iq p a s t
Sections:
3 - 5 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 2 2 , 27
and 34
4.

In Cause No. 140-12, the Board authorized the

drilling of test or second wells that may only be produced
alternatively with the initial well on the sane drilling unit.
5.

The Lower Green Riv'er/Wasatch Formation underlying

tne subject fields constitutes a pool as that tern is defined in
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-2(5) (1953, as amended), and is a highly
complex series of isolated and discontinuous beds of productive
rock that are randomly distributed vertically over a several
thousand feet thick interval.

Normally, the productive beds are

separate and distinct and not in communication with each other.
6.

Many of the productive beds are not correlatable

from well to well and will not afford communication between wells
as close as 1000 feet.

Of the productive beds that correlate,

various geological factors prevent a significant number form
communicating between wells within the same section.
7«

Geologic and engineering information from initial

unit wells and test wells show that a single well will not
effectively drain the recoverable oil and gas underlying any
given 640 acre spacing unit because the productive beds are too

small or have other limiting c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s precluding

effective

and e f f i c i e n t drainage of the recoverable reserves underlyinc the
unit.
8.

Data from production logs and f i e l d performance

show t h a t t e s t wells d r i l l e d under the Order in Cause No. 140-12
a f t e r 1978 have caused the recovery of s u b s t a n t i a l amounts of oil
from separate and d i s t i n c t productive beds and from previously
undepleted productive beds, and t h a t the d r i l l i n g of additional
wells on e x i s t i n g u n i t s j/ill._ijicriease _the ultimate recovery cf_
o_il_. f rpm__the_subj ect f i e l d s .
9.

The p r o h i b i t i o n of simultaneous production from the

i n i t i a l well and t e s t well on the same unit has caused the
shutting in of wells with the p o t e n t i a l to produce jubstantial^
amounts of a d d i t i o n a l r e s e r v e s .
10.

Each additional well d r i l l e d under t h i s order will

tap producing formations t h a t are separate and d i s t i n c t from and
not in communication with any other producing formation and is
not an unnecessary w e l l .
11.

In some areas of the subject f i e l d s , geologic,

engineering, and economic f a c t o r s j u s t i f y d r i l l i n g a d d i t i o n a l
wells on e x i s t i n g u n i t s .

In other a r e a s , geologic, engineering

and economic f a c t o r s may not j u s t i f y d r i l l i n g a d d i t i o n a l wells on
existing units.
raw CUSTOMS OP LAW

1.

Due and regular notice of the time, place and

-*-

purpose of the hearing was given to all interested parties as
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board.
2.

The Board has jurisdiction over the matters covered

by said notice and over all parties interested therein and has
jurisdiction to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set
forth.
3.

The Beard is authorized to modify its previous

orders to permit additional wells to be drilled within
established units under Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6(4) (1953/ as
amended).
4.

An order permitting (a) the drilling of additional

wells on existing units as provided herein and (b) the
simultaneous production of initial wells and additional wells
will prevent the waste of hydrocarbons/ prevent the drilling of
unnecessary wells, and protect correlative rights.
ORDER
.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
To prevent waste of oil/ gas and associated liquid
hydrocarbons/ to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, to
protect correlative rights and to maintain, to the maximum extent
practicable, drilling units of uniform size and shape for the
promotion of more orderly development of the lands described in
Finding of Fact No. 3 above/ the following order is hereby
promulgated to govern operations in said area effective as of
April 12/ 1985:
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A.

Upon the effective date any and all orders of the

Board heretofore promulgated which are inconsistent with the
orders herein set forth shall be and are hereby vacated to the
extent inconsistent herewith.
B.

Additional wells may be drilled, completed, and

produced on established drilling units comprising government
surveyed sections of approximately 640 acres (or other designated
drilling units so long as such unit is at least 400 acres in
size) to a density of no greater than two producing wells en each
unit comprising a section (or other designated unit).
C.

Additional wells may be drilled at the option of

the operator of the unit, based upon geologic and engineering
cata for that unit which will justify the drilling of an
additional well in order to recover additional oil, provided the
additional well appears to be economically feasible.
D.

Economically feasible means that a prudent operator

would have a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs cf
drilling, completing, producing and operating the well, plus a
reasonable profit.
£.

It is not

the intent of this order, in permitting

additional wells to be drilled on established drilling units, to
change or amend the existing contractual rights or relationships,
express or implied, of any parties who share in production or the
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area*
F.

Any additional well must be located at least 1,320

feet from the existing well on' the unit and not closer than 660
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f e e t froai the e x t e r i o r boundary of the u n i t .

No two v e i l s may be

d r i l l e d in any d r i l l i n g unit v i t h i n the same governmental quarter
s e c t i o n or equivalent l e t .
G.

If an operator e l e c t s t o i n i t i a l l y complete a v e i l

s o l e l y v i t h i n producing formations t h a t are separate and d i s i i n c t
from and not in communication v i t h any other producing formation,
the operator w i l l use reasonable precautions in order t h a t such
v e i l i s n o : completed in any producing formation t h a t may be
e f f e c t i v e l y drained by any other v e i l *
E.

Second or t e s t v e i l s d r i l l e d under previous orders

as v e i l as a d d i t i o n a l v e i l s to be d r i l l e d under t h i s order may be
produced simultaneously-vith i n i t i a l v e i l s .
I.

The Board r e t a i n s e x c l u s i v e and continuing

j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l l matters covered by t h i s order and of a l l
p a r t i e s affected thereby and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t the Board r e t a i n s
and r e s e r v e s exclusive and continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n to make
f u r t h e r orders as appropriate and authorized by s t a t u t e and
applicable regulations.
ENTERED t h i s

t~l—day

of

^T V r* f

19 8 5 .

STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

LLIAMS, Chairman
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARK C. MOENCH
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General

ADDENDUM #3

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
OF ANR PRODUCTION COMPANY
FOR AN ORDER SPECIFYING
COSTS TO BE PAID BY S.H.
BENNION AS A NON-CONSENTING
OWNER UNDER FORCED POOLING
ORDER COVERING SECTION 1,
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE
5W-USM, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER
DOCKET NO. 90-021
CAUSE NO. 139-63

Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of ANR
Production Company (ANR), this cause was initially heard before
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural
Resources, on Thursday, May 24, 1990, at 10:00 a.m. in the
Boardroom of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North
Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah.
At the hearing of May 24, 1990, arguments of the
parties were heard.. The following Board members were present at
the hearing:
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman
Richard B. Larsen
Judy F. Lever
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as
well as board member John M. Garr

The Board was represented by Alan S. Bachman, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah.
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining
were made by Dianne Nielson, Director, Oil, Gas and Mining, and
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas, and John R.
Baza, Petroleum Engineer.
ANR was represented by John Harrington, Esq., and David
M. Laraime, Sr. Landman.

Bennion was represented by Peter

Stirba, Esq.
The Board took the matter under advisement and
requested legal counsel from the Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah.
On or about June 26, 1990, the Secretary of the Board
transmitted to Petitioner, Respondent's counsel and the Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining the list of six issues with respect to
which the Board wished further legal briefing.

On July 25, 1990,

after receiving leave to file Amicus Curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil
and Gas Association (RMOGA) filed a Brief and Response to the
questions piresented by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on June
21, 1990.

The parties Briefs have been considered by the Board.

On August 23, 1990, pursuant to notice, a continuation of the
original hearing was held in the Boardroom of the Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite
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301, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The following Board members were

present:
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman
Richard B. Larsen
Judy F. Lever
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as
well as board member John M. Garr.
The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah.
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining
were made by Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas.
Neither the Petitioners nor Respondent were present.
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the
testimony adduced and the exhibits reviewed in all said hearings
and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Due and regular notice of the time, place and

purpose of the May 24, 1990 hearing was given to all interested
parties as required by law and the rules and regulations of the
Board.

ANR put on evidence regarding the cost of drilling to

date and the estimated costs of drilling to completion of the
Miles 2-1B5 well.

Further, ANR presented testimony and other

evidence of its position concerning the risk incurred by the
consenting interest owners in the drilling of the Miles 2-1B5
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well.

S.H. Bennion, through counsel, argued the legal points set

forth in his written response, but submitted no evidence in
rebuttal to ANR's evidence concerning risk of drilling on the
Miles 2-1B5 well. The cause was continued by the Board and
further argument in the form of briefs to specific questions of
the Board has been provided by counsel and Amicus Curiae.

This

cause was heard again on August 23, 1990, with due and regular
notice of the time, place and purpose of the hearing having been
given to all interested parties as required by law and the rules
of the Board.
2.

The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter,

of the Request for Agency Action and over all parties interested
therein and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the order
hereinafter set forth.
3.

The Request for Agency Action in this matter is a

request to modify the order in Cause No. 139-13, specifying the
percentage of costs to be recovered by all consenting owners of
the Miles 2-1B5 well, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West,
USM, Duchesne County, Utah, (hereinafter "Miles 2-1B5 well").
The order in Cause No. 139-13 dated April 30, 1981, and effective
July 26, 1979, force pooled the drilling unit created by the
order of this Board in Cause No. 139-3.
Specifically the Request for Agency Action sought
relief as follows:
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(a) That the consenting owners of the the Miles 2-1B5
well be reimbursed for S.H. Bennion's share, a non-consenting
mineral interest owner, of the costs out of production from the
unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's interests;
(b)

That the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5 well

own and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 21B5 well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations
payable out of production until the consenting owners have been
paid the amount due under the terms of the modified order
relating to the subject drilling unit;
(c)

That each consenting owner of the Miles 2-1B5 well

be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar
obligations, the share of the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to its
interest in the separate drilling units and unless the consenting
owners agreed otherwise, its proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's
share of such production until costs are recovered;
(d) That Bennion be entitled to receive, subject to
royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production from
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to S.H. Bennion's interest in the
subject drilling unit after the consenting interest owners
recover from S.H. Bennion's share of production the following:
(i)

100% of the non-consenting owner's share

of the costs of service equipment beyond the wellhead
connections, plus 100% of the non-consenting owner's

-5-
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share of the cost of operation of the well commencing
with the first production and continuing until the
consenting owners have recovered these costs; and
(ii)

200% of that portion of the costs and

expenses of staking the location, well-site
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling,
reworking, deepening, or plugging back, testing,
completing, and the cost of equipment in the well,
after deducting any cash contributions received by
the consenting owner;
(iii)

Interest charged in the amount of the

prime lending rate as periodically determined byCitibank of New York, N.A., plus two percentage points,
(e)

That S.H. Bennion's ownership result in S.H.

Bennion receiving as a royalty, the average landowner's royalty
attributable to each tract within the subject drilling unit,
determined prior to the commencement of drilling, and payable
from the production allocated to each tract until the consenting
owners recovered the cost described in paragraphs (d), (i), (ii),
and (iii) set forth above.
4.

The Board's previously entered order in Cause No.

139-13 force pooled all interests in the subject drilling unit,
finding, inter alia, that S.H. Bennion was the record owner of an
unleased, undivided, one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas
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and minerals located in the northeast quarter, southwest quarter,
and northwest quarter, southeast quarter, of Section 1, Township
2 South, Range 5 West, Uinta Special Meridian, Duchesne County,
Utah.

Further, the order held that Shell Oil Company, the

majority working interest owner and the sole operator of the
subject drilling unit, was willing to allow S.H. Bennion to share
in the proceeds of production of that unit from first production
in the Tew No. 1-1B5 well (hereinafter "Tew 1-1B5") as the
designated production well capable of producing oil and gas in
commercial quantities in the subject drilling unit.

The order

made no findings concerning the sharing of costs between
consenting and non-consenting owners.
5.

This original forced pooling order and S.H.

Bennion's interest in the pooling unit as set forth in the Cause
No. 139-13 was determined prior to amendments to the forced
pooling statute in 1977.
6.

Section 40-6-6 (6), Utah Code Ann.

On August 1, 1986, Petitioner ANR succeeded to the

interest of Shell .Oil Company in the subject drilling unit and
took over operation of the Tew 1-1B5 effective December 1, 1986.
7.

Effective July 1983, the Utah Legislature repealed

the then existing Oil and Gas Conservation Act and enacted a new
statute.

On April 12, 1985, this Board as enpowered by the 1983

Legislature entered its order in Cause No. 139-42 authorizing the
drilling and simultaneous production^of two wells from each
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drilling unit in the Greater Altamont-Bluebell-Cedar Rim-Sink
Area in which Section 1 the subject drilling unit and wells are
located.
8.

On February 6, 1990, ANR commenced the Miles 2-1B5

well in Section 1 as the increased density second well in
Section 1.
9.

On May 24, 1990, arguments of the parties in this

cause and matter were heard and ANR put on evidence regarding the
cost of drilling to date, the estimated costs of drilling to
completion and the basis for its requests for a 200% non-consent
penalty.

S.H. Bennion put on no evidence in rebuttal.
10.

On June 21, 1990, the Board submitted questions to

the parties for further briefing.
11.

The Board in reviewing its order in Cause No.

139-13 determines that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances since the entry of that order.

The Board finds

that the change in statutory authority authorizing the drilling
and simultaneous production of more than one well in the subject
drilling unit, the geological and economic evidence supporting
its order in Cause No. 139-42 and the subsequent February 6, 1990
commencement of the Miles 2-1B5 well as an increased density well
in the subject drilling unit, constitute changes in circumstances
sufficient to support modification of its order in Cause No.
139-13.
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12.

Additionally, the Board in reviewing its order in

Cause No. 139-13 determines that the order is silent as to the
rights of consenting and non-consenting interest owners under the
pooling order concerning reimbursement for costs out of
production and share of production. The Board therefore finds
that regulation of operations in this forced pooling unit must be
modified and supplemented upon terms that are just and
reasonable.
13.

The Board finds that the Oil and Gas Conservation

Act of 1983, 1983 Utah Laws Chapter 205 provides the applicable
statutory grounds on which to base its modified order-

The Board

finds that all critical facts before the Board concerning this
Request for Agency Action occurred after the 1983 legislation was
enacted.

The Board finds the following facts to be critical:
(a) Increased density production wells were first

specifically authorized by the Utah Legislature in the 1983 Act.
(See Utah Code Ann. Section 40-6-6(4) (Supp. 1990).)

This

Board's order dated April 12f 1985, in Cause No. 139-63
authorized the drilling of second wells for simultaneous
production because it found that one well per drilling unit was
not adequately draining the pool?
(b) The Miles 2-1B5 well was drilled as a second well
under the Board's increased density order after 1983; and
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(c)

Prior to the above-stated events, this Board's

order in Cause No. 139-13 would not have required modification
because no additional wells could have been drilled.
14.

S.H. Bennion has not entered into any prior

agreement with consenting interest owners which supplants the
statutory authority and duty of this board to impose costs as
provided under § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
15.

That within the range of 150% to 200% of the

mandatory non-consent penalty provided under § 40-6-6(6)(b), Utah
Code Ann. (1953, as amended), there is sufficient evidence of
risk incurred by the consenting owner that a penalty of 175% is
appropriate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

All interests in the subject drilling unit were

force pooled by order of this Board as of July 26, 1979.
2.

The Board has the necessary and inherent authority,

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 and 40-6-6, (1953 as
amended) to amend,^ modify or supplement its previous pooling
orders where there has been a substantial change in circumstances
or an omission in a prior order and where failure to modify the
order would result in the continued enforcement of terms which
are not just and reasonable or which would fail to protect
correlative rights.
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4.

The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will

prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and
protect correlative rights.
Sufficient evidence now being available upon which to
reach a decision, the Board issues the following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The order previously entered in Cause No. 139-13 is

amended to provide that the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5
well shall be reimbursed from S.H. Bennion's share of costs out
of the production from the unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's
interests.
2.

Consenting owners from the subject unit shall own

and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 2-1B5
well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations payable
out of production until the consenting owners have been paid the
amount due under the terms of this order relating to the subject
drilling unit.
3.

Each consenting interest owner in the unit will be

entitled to receive, subject to royalty or other similar
obligations, his or her share of production of the Miles 2-1B5
well applicable to their interest in the drilling unit and, its
proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's share or such production
until costs are recovered.
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4.

S.H. Bennion shall be entitled to receive, subject

to royalty or similar obligations, his share of production from
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to his interest in the subject
drilling unit after the consenting owners have recovered from
S.H. Bennion7s share of production the following:
(a) 100% of S.H. Bennion's share as nonconsenting owner of the cost of surface
equipment beyond the well head connections plus
100% of the non-consenting owners share of the costs
of operation of the well commencing with the first
production and continuing until the consenting owners
have retrieved these costs;
(b) 175% of that portion of the costs and
expenses of staking the location, well-side
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, deepening, or plugging back, testing, completing, and the cost of equipment in the well after
deducting any cash contributions received by the
consenting owners; and
(c)

Interest on these amounts is to be

assessed at the amount of the prime lending rate as
periodically determined by Citibank of New York, NA,
plus two percentage points.
(d)

S.H. Bennion/s interest not currently

being subject to lease or other contract development

of oil and gas, S.H. Bennion is entitled to receive
as royalty, the average landowner's royalty
attributable to each tract within the subject
drilling unit, effective as of the date prior to the
commencement of the drilling of the well on the subject
drilling unit.
5.

To the extent that any previous order of the Board

is inconsistent with this order, those orders are hereby vacated
to the extent of such inconsistency.
6.

The Board retains exclusive and continuing

jurisdiction over all matters covered by this order and over all
the parties affected thereby and particularly reserves exclusive
and continuing jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate
and as authorized by statute and regulation.
DATED this O y Q

day of

&QpsU^

L&W-

f 1990.

STATE OF UTAH
DARD OF OIL, GAS^AND MINING

S W. CARTER
ING CHAIRMAN

